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Looking at the situation as a whole the author concludes that while defaults
have been .numprous they have been negligible when compared with the total
number of municipalities throughout the United States. Furthermore, while
defaults have not been restricted to any one section of the United States, and
have occurred in every type of bond, losses to bondholders upon defaulted
bonds have been relatively negligible when compared with the total amount of
bonds outstanding at any one time or with the total bonds in default within any
given period. "Defaults have been neither so numerous nor so acute as to
warrant a lack of confidence in the soundness of municipal credit, or in the
character of local administration." In short, municipal bonds are still a good
investment provided the investor exercises a reasonable amount of care and
thought in his buying.
The Foreword to this volume states that one purpose in writing it is to lay
the groundwork for further studies in municipal debt administration. This
purpose has been amply accomplished. The author is to be congratulated on
making such an excellent contribution to the developing science of municipal
finance administration and the Municipal Finance Officers' Association of the
United States and Canada can take pride in having sponsored thebook.
WILLIAM M.

HUDSON.*

By Albert S. Osborn.
Albany: The Boyd Printing Company, 1937, pp. xiii, 239.

THE MIND OF THE JUROR AS JUDGE OF THE FACTS.

There seems to be abroad in this land of ours a serious confusion of
concepts which threatens the very supports of our democracy. Too many
there are who have concluded that the scientific approach in sociology and law
is synonymous with science in its broadest implication. As a consequence,
thousands of facts are laboriously assembled and classified, arbitrarily or otherwise; and eventually and perhaps in many cases insidiously, a new order of
human conduct is manufactured. What began as a voyage of discovery ends
by calling the old land a new name.
Things being as they are, it is not surprising that the highly human institution, the jury, has been scientifically "approached". Researchers report, for
instance, that in the County of X a specified number of juries have reached a
certain result on a certain problem while in the County of Y they have done
the opposite under similar circumstances. So far so good, at least mathematically. But then follows the absurd deduction that since juries do not manufacture the same pattern day in and day out they are useless machines and
should be abolished. Although no one has seriously urged it to date, it is
assumed that the same conclusion might be reached on judges who have been
known to disagree on the law as well as the facts. Juries being human do act
according to their species in their deliberations. Indeed, intuitively, if not
* Professor of Economics and Sociology, Long Island University. Member
of the New York Bar.
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scientifically, they probably know how to react to other members of the same
species. Hence, before we eliminate humanity from our system of justice,
great care must be exercised in selecting and appraising a substitute fact finder.
Facts found with a human approach may not always be true, but in the long
run will prove more satisfactory than those objectively discovered, whatever
that may be.
In "The Mind of the Juror as Judge of the Facts", Mr. Osborn, who is
known and respected in the courts throughout the land as an expert on handwriting, gives us his impressions of the jury from a unique point. It is not
the point of view of a lawyer nor of a judge, nor of an average layman, but
rather of one who is constantly trying to persuade juries as to the accuracies
of his deductions in a highly specialized field of practical science. It is natural
that one so thoroughly qualified in this highly technical profession, would find
the verdicts of juries unsatisfactory at least occasionally. Although the author
is aware of many faults in the jury system, some of which have been pointed
out by others, his condemnation is far from universal. He pleads not for
abolition but for reform; ' he wants trials to be "dignified investigations" and
2
not "plain fights"; he urges that judges be given the right of comment in all
jurisdictions; ' and he is impatient with appeals to the jury other than logical.'
It is indeed refreshing to learn that one with so much experience is unwilling
to throw over the jury system, even though he is critical of it.
This is a volume which might well serve as a manual for prospective
jurors. The ins and outs of trial by jury are laid bare. The scene in the
court room is adequately and clearly portrayed. No prospective juror who
reads it could approach his assigned duty without a great awe for the majesty
of the law and a deep sense of his great responsibility. The many anecdotes
which the author interweaves in his text serve to illuminate the points which he
makes and to stimulate interest.
There are many members of the bar who must remember how in their
early days they acquired their advance information on jury trials from Mr.
Francis L. Wellman's work on "The Art of Cross-examination". The book
under review may be used by the young lawyer today for the same purpose.
It will serve as an excellent preview of the terrain where, some day he must
battle for justice. Mr. Osborn's book is certainly more comprehensive, if not
more dramatic, than Wellman's. Although the author is frank, he is neither
disillusioning nor discouraging. The unfavorable criticisms which he makes
of lawyers in their trial practice are for the most part well deserved. However,
1,"It
sometimes seems a hazardous thing to put liberty and rights into the
control and custody of weak, prejudiced human beings swayed by passion and
emotion, but there seems to be no better way to do it. Every reasonable precaution should of course be employed to prevent error, but even then ignorance
and the weaknesses of human nature may sacrifice truth and reward wrong.
If justice and liberty are to be protected eternal vigilance must be the watchP. 101.
word."
2
P. 9.
3
P. 12.
'P. 25.
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they should serve as caveats rather than deterrents to the young practitioner
who stands on the threshold of the temple of justice.
EDWARD J. O'ToOLF*

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Ernest G. Lorenzen.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1937, pp. i, 1138.

St.

Great strides have been made in the teaching of conflict of laws in the
last decade. The course is usually a popular one with students, since conflict
of laws has some contact with almost all other law courses in the curriculum
and so serves as a review of these courses in the best possible manner by an
approach from a different point of view. Conflict of laws lends itself to a
scholarly emphasis on legal principles.
With the increased interest in conflict of laws has come the publication
of a number of casebooks to meet the needs both of teachers and students.
Following the publication of the "Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws"
by the American Law Institute in 1934, and Professor Beale's noteworthy
contribution' to legal scholarship, three new casebooks have appeared in the
space of two years. First came Cheatham, Dowling and Goodrich,' bringing
to the subject a fresh viewpoint, the latest cases, and modem pedagogical
methods. Then came Harper and Taintor,3 a rather difficult and terrifying
volume for undergraduates. Finally, as if in response to so much competition,
the publishers must have prevailed upon Professor Lorenzen, a familiar and
able scholar in the field, to revise his "Cases and Materials on the Conflict of
Laws." The West Publishing Company now offers the teaching community
the fourth edition.
Any work of Professor Lorenzen is welcome. This edition includes cases
on Domicile, omitted from the third edition. Such omission had left a void
that teachers of the subject felt should be filled. A second change in the new
edition is the inclusion of provisions of the "Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws" in all parts of the book. This is quite helpful to students and, one
might add, to courts. The excellent features of the Cheatham, Dowling and
Goodrich book, especially the chapter on Sources and Choice of Law, have
been met in part in this new edition by an introductory chapter on the history
of the conflict of laws and a general survey of the subject plus introductory
notes to each chapter and section. As a further inducement to the student and
teacher to use the Fourth Edition, there are dissenting opinions, excerpts from
law reviews, and statutory provisions, and, finally, a more palatable presentation of the cases, through a rigorous "cut" in the presentations of the facts,
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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